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INTRODUCTION
For well over a decade now, Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) and all its variations' have been hailed in rhetoric and
anecdote as the Prince Charming to a court system in distress.2
Professor Cary Coglianese challenges that claim in the case of
negotiated regulations, one form of ADR.3 Aside from providing
a brief commentary on his thesis, however, this Article will discuss
ADR from a broader perspective, assessing its effect on the quan-
tity and quality of the work of the courts-primarily the federal
courts, where I work. I want to briefly examine three kinds of
ADR programs: those that take place inside the court (which are
sometimes called "court-annexed programs"), those that occur
inside the administrative agency (or "agency-annexed programs,"
only a small portion of whose product may come before the
courts), and negotiated regulations, some of which (despite all
good efforts) continue to be challenged on review-often in my
own D.C. Circuit Court.4
I. COURT-ANNEXED ADR
Most judges are happy when their cases settle either before
trial or on appeal before argument. And indeed most civil cases
filed in the federal district courts do settle or drop out before
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; Chief
Judge, 1986-1991; L.L.B., Yale Law School, 1951.
1. These processes include arbitration, mediation, settlement conferences, early neu-
tral evaluation, mini-trials, and summary jury trials.
2. See, e.g., James F. Henry, No Longer a Rarity, Judicial ADR is Preparing for
Great Growth-But Much Care is Needed, 9 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF
LITIGATION 95, 96 (1991) (discussing the increased use of ADR).
3. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Ne-
gotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE LJ. 1255 (1997).
4. Of the 3295 administrative appeals in federal courts of appeals in 1995, 617 were
filed in the D.C. Circuit; the Ninth Circuit, with 921 appeals filed, was the only Circuit
to surpass us. See ADMINSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BuSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 20 tbl.2, 87-90 tbl.B-1 (1995) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BusI-
NESS].
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trial; a good number fall out on appeal as well.5 But in the last
decade court administrators and long-range planners have aggres-
sively sought to create even higher rates of settlement. For exam-
ple, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 provides for pretrial con-
ferences in which the presiding judge will generally seek to move
the parties toward settlement,6 and Rule 68 penalizes the party
who rejects a settlement offer and then obtains a final judgment
no more favorable than the rejected offer.7 The Civil Justice Re-
form Act (CJRA) of 19908 requires every federal district court to
prepare a plan aimed at reducing delay and costs in civil litigation,
and directs the courts to consider using a formal ADR program
for pretrial referral of some types of cases.9 In addition, ten pilot
districts tested six specific case management techniques, including
the referral of certain cases to ADR programs."0
Unsurprisingly, the CJRA greatly expanded the use of ADR
in federal district courts." All but thirteen of our ninety-four fed-
eral district courts presently authorize judges to use ADR on a
case-by-case basis.'2 Two-thirds of the CJRA plans provide for set-
tlement conferences, which are often run by magistrate judges.13
One-third of the plans authorize the establishment of a court-an-
nexed mediation program and one-third authorize arbitration un-
5. During 1995, the number of trials completed by all federal district court judges
decreased 5%, including a 7% drop in civil trials; in fact, only 17,816 civil and criminal
trials were completed while 185,324 civil cases were terminated by judges before or dur-
ing pretrial proceedings. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 29. More than 50% of
all appeals filed in the federal courts are disposed of by means other than a decision on
the merits. See COMMITrTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 68 n.26 (1995). That figure holds
for administrative appeals as well. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 114 tbl.B-5A
(1406 out of the 3264 administrative appeals in 1995 were terminated on procedural
grounds, including 352 of the D.C. Circuit's 661 administrative appeals). Only 25% of the
D.C. Circuit's administrative appeals are terminated on the merits, compared to almost
49% for all federal courts of appeals. See id at 110 tbl.B-5.
6. See FED. R. Crv. P. 16.
7. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
9. See id § 473(b)(4).
10. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICS 4-5
(1996).
11. See The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 Final Report, at 35-36 (on file with
author) [hereinafter CJRA Report].
12. See id.
13. See id.
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der an existing statute, 4 although only ten districts are allowed to
mandate arbitration. 5 Finally, fourteen districts authorize early
neutral evaluation. 6
The Rand Institute for Civil Justice evaluated the pilot dis-
tricts over a four-year period in order to assess ADR's effective-
ness at reducing cost and delay.' The results of its evaluation are
decidedly mixed.'" The Rand Report concluded that the value of
ADR varied widely depending on the design and implementation
of the local program.' Overall, however, its analysis of ten pilot
and ten comparison districts showed that even mandatory arbitra-
tion did not significantly reduce cost or delay.20 Its separate evalu-
ation of mediation and early neutral evaluation in six districts
found "no strong statistical evidence" that those programs cut
down on delays or billable hours.2' The Report did note, howev-
er, that most participants in ADR enjoyed the experience.'
Unsurprisingly, it concluded that these types of ADR were "not a
panacea for perceived problems of cost and delay. '
A separate study of three demonstration districts, conducted
by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), published somewhat more
positive results.24 Close to half of the attorneys interviewed in
each district thought that ADR reduced costs. Further, approxi-
mately forty percent in each district thought that it saved time;
although in reality, only one district's data indicated that time
actually was saved. 5 The Rand and FJC analyses led to a recom-
14. See iL at 31-32.
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 658 (1994).
16. See CJRA Report, supra note 11, at 36.
17. See id.
18. See JAMES S. KAKALiK ET AL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUA-
TION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 74-76
(1996).
19. See id. at 5.
20. See id. at xxviii.
21. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION
OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT xxxiv (1996).
22. See id. at xxxiii-iv.
23. Id. at xxxiv.
24. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTtL, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMIT-
TEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT. A STUDY OF THE FIVE
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF
1990, at 8-10 (1997).
25. See id. at 7-9.
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mendation by the Judicial Conference of the United States to
Congress that continued use of and experimentation with ADR
was justified in the federal courts.26
So basically we have learned that the participants approve of
ADR, and that so far it has had some effect, but has not made a
huge impact, on cost or delay in the federal trial courts.27 Strange-
ly enough, from a judge's point of view, that's good news on bal-
ance. Court-annexed ADR is a useful addition to our toolbox,
even if it can't fix everything. In my circuit, some sixty to seventy
cases a year are channelled into available mediation programs for
at least one mandatory session. Our lawyer-mediators work for
free, and the program causes a fair number of cases (almost a
third), including a few big ones, to disappear from our appellate
dockets each year.
These pre-pubescent developments in ADR may seem like
ho-hum stuff, but many academics have long fretted over what
they perceive to be the judiciary's overenthusiasm for settlements
and ADR. Beginning with Owen Fiss's classic article "Against
Settlement,"'  academics have expressed concern that a judicial
system overwhelmingly concerned with settling cases will: 1) de-
generate into a two-tiered system in which the poor and disad-
vantaged receive quick and dirty solutions while full-scale trials are
reserved for the rich and famous;2 9 2) cause poor and badly-
lawyered clients to suffer disproportionately in nontrial fora for
lack of the benevolent spirit of an Article III judge looking out
for their rights;3" 3) harm the judicial system by reducing the num-
26. See CJRA Report, supra note 11, at 37-38. The Rand findings have been
deemed by some as too premature to serve as the basis for any conclusions on whether
further federal support should be provided for ADR. See Elizabeth Plapinger, Rand
Study of Civil Justice Reform Act Sparks Debate, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 24, 1997, at B18, B18;
see also Deborah Hensler, Puzzling over ADR, FACTS & TRENDS, April 1997, at 6 (sug-
gesting that ADR has the greatest potential to be effective before a case is filed and
that its benefits lie in creative solutions and party satisfaction rather than cost and delay
reduction).
27. For a similar appraisal, see generally Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a
Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury
Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1619-22 (1995) (describing the uses and limitations of
mediation and facilitated negotiation in mass personal injury cases and contending that
while parties are well served by agreements reached through these means, actual partici-
pation of the parties is limited).
28. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE W. 1073 (1984).
29. See id. at 1087-88.
30. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement or Litigation: A Critical Retrospective, in RE-
1448 [Vol. 46:1445
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ber of legal precedents and rationales available to sustain its juris-
prudence;3' 4) bury in sealed settlements the resolution of issues
of truly public significance-most distressingly those implicating
the visibility of public decisions and the accountability of public
servants; and 5) transform Article Ill judges from authoritative
enunciators of societal values and constitutional norms into mere
"managerial judges."33
On the other side, some academics debunk the notions that
there are likely to be too many settlements, that a solution
worked out through a negotiated procedure will necessarily be of
lower quality than one dispensed in our adversarial court system,
and that negotiation disfavors the weak and poor any more than
litigation disfavors them.34 These ADR supporters also point out
that we have no real evidence to support the contention that fre-
quent settlement leads to under-enforcement or lack of vindication
of the social goals incorporated in legislation, and that as long as
ADR is freely chosen by the parties, the theorems of economics
favor settlements3 5 The big question for this group is how to de-
sign ADR programs that will produce more and better settle-
ments.
36
Professor Judith Resnik offers an interesting perspective on
what is actually happening in the competition between settlement
and litigation in the real world of the judiciary (an oxymoron, per-
haps).37 After tracing the Supreme Court's historic turnaround
from skepticism bordering on disdain for settlement devices to all-
embracing hospitality toward them (the Court hasn't seen one it
doesn't like for some time now),38 she postulates that the tradi-
tional concept of the courts as a forum primarily for adjudication,
with settlement and ADR as mere secondary alternatives, is being
changed such that settlement, not litigation, is now viewed as a
FORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13, 22 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996).
31. See Frank E. Sander et al., Judicial (Mis)Use of ADR? A Debate, 27 U. ToL. L.
REV. 885, 893 (1996).
32. See id. at 1085.
33. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 378 (1982).
34. See Miller, supra note 30, at 22-25.
35. See id. at 23-24.
36. See, ag., id. at 25-30 (reviewing mechanisms that can be used to overcome set-
tlement obstacles such as party optimism and agency costs).
37. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 211 (1995).
38. See id. at 222-29.
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primary activity and goal of the courts.39 Courts have taken over
ADR techniques and have made them their own; gone are the
notions that the best judges monitor (and occasionally modulate)
social policies, or announce important social values. Now the best
judges are those who excel at facilitating private settlements. Ad-
judication is widely perceived both within the judiciary and outside
the judiciary as too formalistic,' too expensive and time-consum-
ing, often irrelevant to the merits of a controversy, and just plain
"not worth it."'4' Even if a case does stay on the docket nowa-
days, the emphasis is on pretrial proceedings, motions to dismiss,
and summary judgments 4 while factfinding is increasingly delegat-
ed to non-Article III judges. "Let's make a deal" is the new court-
house motto. Resnik predicts that "we are approaching a time
when many a civil trial will be characterized as a 'pathological
event.' 5
4 3
Be that as it may, Resnik warns that the marriage of the
courts and ADR, like most marriages, will transform both par-
ties.' ADR, which its originators envisioned as constantly expand-
ing in its forms and variations, will find itself uncomfortably con-
strained in its courtly new home where the premium will be on
cheap, reliable methods of settlement, and mediation and settle-
ment conferences will be preferred to arbitration.45 In the end,
Resnik fears, the claimant may face the worst of both worlds-a
diminished opportunity to litigate and a punier selection of alter-
natives to litigation:
As this century draws to its end, we can observe the melding of
ADR into adjudication, and then the narrowing of ADR and its
refocusing as a tool to produce contractual agreements among
disputants. The focus is shifting from adjudication to resolution.
Frank Sander's lovely image of the accessible, multi-doored
courthouse-with one door wide open for adjudication-has now
39. See id. at 229-35.
40. See id. at 247.
41. Id. at 266.
42. For example, in the D.C. district court in calendar year 1996, 42% of civil case
terminations were by dismissal, 19% by pretrial settlement, 3% by trial, 22% by summary
judgment, 7% by transfer to other courts, and 7% by "other." See Statistics from the Of.
fice of the Clerk, United States District Court for the District of Columbia (on file with
author).
43. Resnik, supra note 37, at 261 (footnote omitted).
44. See id. at 255.
45. Arbitration is costlier and takes more time.
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been eclipsed. The door to the twentieth century's version of
adjudication is closing.46
Professor Resnik's scenario may be unduly pessimistic, but
from my vantage point her scenario is not at all implausible. The
lines between ADR programs--even court-annexed ones-and
traditional court procedures are growing ever more blurred, as the
courts themselves incorporate ADR techniques into their opera-
tions in furtherance of what increasingly seems to be our preemi-
nent goal: letting parties settle their disputes for themselves.
II. AGENCY-ANNEXED ADR
ADR has also gained support as a substitute for agency adju-
dications. Some of its most aggressive proponents can be found in
the Clinton Administration. For example, Peter Steenland, who
holds the newly-created position of Senior Counsel for ADR at
the Department of Justice recently co-authored an article that an-
nounced: "More and more, the government finds the tools of
[ADR] a useful means of settling even more disputes than unas-
sisted settlement discussions can yield."'47 The Administrative Dis-
pute Resolution Act of 199048 (ADRA) validated the use of
ADR at the agency level and established guidelines outlining eligi-
ble cases and procedures. Follow-up Executive Orders urged agen-
cies to try agency-annexed ADR.49 The Justice Department's Se-
nior Counsel for ADR reports that within the Department individ-
ual sections have issued criteria, money has been earmarked to
hire "facilitators," and the agency "culture" now rewards lawyers
who settle as richly as it rewards attorneys who litigate.50 Of
course, there are limits on the use of agency-annexed ADR. Some
46. Id. at 265.
47. Peter R. Steenland, Jr. & Peter A. Appel, The Ongoing Role of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution in Federal Government Litigation, 27 U. TOL L. REv. 805, 805 (1996).
For earlier accounts of agency use of ADR, see Charles Pou, Jr., Federal Agency Use of
"ADR": The Experience to Date, in ACUS SOURCEBOOC FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 101, 101-02 (1987) [hereinafter ADR
SOURCEBOOK] and Philip J. Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Proce-
dures and the Administrative Process in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra, at 437, 438-43.
48. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C. tits. 5, 9, 28, 29, 31, 41).
49. See Executive Order No. 12,778, § 1(c)(2), 3 C.F.R. 359, 361 (1991), reprinted in
28 U.S.C. § 519 (1994).
50. See Steenland & Appel, supra note 47, at 817-18.
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cases will be ill-suited to ADR, such as where the interpretation of
a statute is critical, where the government has a jurisdictional de-
fense, or where settlement might interfere with the valid exercise
of agency discretion or require new appropriations.
Despite these limits, my eighteen years on the bench persuade
me that a rich motherlode of cases that come before regulatory
agencies may be settled, with no damage to precedent or to public
values. The more of these cases that agency-annexed ADR con-
cludes, the better.
The only context in which courts are likely to be involved in
agency ADR programs is in their traditional role as settlement re-
viewers. Although at this juncture it seems doubtful that courts
will have many occasions to review settlements resulting from
agency ADR programs, largely because agencies are likely to exer-
cise caution in picking out the cases that go into ADR, it may
nonetheless be useful to explain briefly how courts conduct such
reviews. Outside of those cases in which our approval of settle-
ments or consent decrees is required by law, we will usually disap-
prove settlements only when third parties who did not participate
in the settlement can demonstrate that their legal rights have been
injured, or when a party to the settlement shows that the settle-
ment violates statutory or constitutional norms, is totally unreason-
able, was fraudulently induced, or is against public policy. 1 Occa-
sionally, parties differ over the proper interpretation of the settle-
ment and come to court for a binding construction of its terms. In
general, reviewing courts defer to an agency's interpretation of a
settlement that the agency has approved unless it strikes us as
nonsensical or irrational; if it does, we will remand for a more
adequate explanation from the agency. 2
These normal principles of judicial review apply unless specific
statutes provide otherwise. A number of statutes do precisely this.
51. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATrIVE LAW §
9.5.5 (1993) (citing United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067,
1072 (W.D.N.Y. 1982)).
52. See, e.g., Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 924
F.2d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (remanding case because agency interpretation of settle-
ment between electric cooperatives was "rather strained"); Associated Gas Distribs. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 893 F.2d 349, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (remanding case
because agency did not give an adequate, reasoned basis for its interpretation of a settle-
ment); National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 811 F.2d
1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (deferring to agency's interpretation of a settlement agree-
ment).
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The ADRA, for example, incorporates the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) provision for review of arbitration and states that there
will be no review of an agency's refusal to use ADR. 4 Some agen-
cies require, as part of their voluntary ADR procedures, that the
parties waive judicial review of any arbitration agreement. The
FAA itself makes the resulting award final except where it was
procured by corruption or fraud, where an arbitrator's misconduct
prejudiced a party's right, or where the arbitrator exceeded his
delegated powers." The Randolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act56
exemplifies a contrary approach. Under this Act, arbitration
awards involving the licensing of blind vendors doing business on
federal property must be reviewed under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act's (APA) "arbitrary and capricious"57 standard58 Given
this combination of statutory mandates and normal judicial review
principles, the legal landscape of judicial review of agency ADR is
something of a patchwork quilt.
Still, even under the normal, narrow rules for reviewing settle-
ments, courts are likely to examine a settlement more carefully if
they think one party may occupy a disadvantaged bargaining posi-
tion. Harry Edwards, Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, recently
wrote an interesting opinion in a case challenging the validity of a
clause in employees' contracts that required them to submit any
employment grievances-including those based on statutory or
constitutional violations-to arbitration. 9 The court upheld the
arbitration requirement.' However, it interpreted the normally
narrow exceptions for judicial review of arbitration awards fairly
broadly, to assure that the award does not threaten any explicit
53. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
54. See 5 U.S.C. § 570 (1994).
55. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). These principles of review still allow for a healthy
number of arbitration reviews in our courts each year. In all, 4182 arbitration cases were
filed in district courts, representing 10% of all civil cases. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra
note 4, at 67 tbl.S-12. For a representative case involving the appeal of a private arbi-
tration, see AL-Harbi v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (declining to va-
cate arbitration award, finding no "evident partiality" on the part of the arbitrator, nor
any showing of he demonstrated "manifest disregard" of applicable law), cert. denied 117
S. Ct. 432 (1996).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
57. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
58. See 20 U.S.C. § 107d-2(a) (1994).
59. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
60. See id at 1489.
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public policy, laws, or legal precedent, particularly any that might
implicate employees' substantive rights. 61
I would not be surprised if courts reviewed some types of
agency ADR agreements under a similarly not-so-deferential stan-
dard, to insure that agencies are not being blatantly unfair or coer-
cive, or flouting their statutory obligations. In the absence of any
special statutory directive, I would expect ADR agreements ordi-
narily to be reviewed under the deferential standard applicable to
settlements generally. But the courts may be a bit tougher on re-
view of agency-annexed ADR settlements than on settlements
agreed to between parties under private ADR auspices or without
any intermediaries at all. This potential disparity might be based
on a perception that the agency has to turn a squarer corner when
dealing with members of the public than parties do with each oth-
er. Additionally, it may well be that if agency ADR catches on,
Congress will want to lay down a uniform review standard to clear
up the inevitable confusion and disparity that now exist between
review of different kinds of ADR. On the other hand, the number
of appeals from agency ADR agreements may turn out to be so
few that no special legislative action is required.
While the courts have become increasingly hospitable to
ADR, they can be expected to evidence discomfort in cases where
they think the agency has exploited private parties by using ADR.
Virtually all agency ADR is, of course, still voluntary; were man-
datory ADR to be more widely authorized, I suspect that the
scope of judicial review would become broader.62
Thus far, courts have been most active in overturning settle-
ments in high visibility cases involving agency enforcement of
regulatory laws, where the interests of third parties or the public
in general are indisputably implicated.6 Bringing these types of
61. See id. at 1486-87. See, eg., Darryl Van Duch, Assault on Mandatory Arbitra-
tion, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at B1 (Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
and National Association of Securities Dealers oppose mandatory arbitration in employee
disputes involving statutory rights). See also Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119
F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997) (skeptically scrutinizing arbitration agreements entered into
by employees as a condition of employment).
62. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 30, at 23-25 (arguing that the economic justification
for encouraging settlements is more controversial where negotiations are compelled over
one party's objection).
63. See, e.g., Environmental Tech. Council v. Browner, Civ. A. Nos. 94-2119,
94-2346, 1995 WL 238328, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 1995) (refusing to approve a proposed
consent decree because it lacked an impartial determination as to the reasonableness of
1454 [Vol. 46:1445
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settlements, which most commonly involve antitrust, securities, or
oil and gas regulation, into agency ADR programs is problematic,
to say the least. It is not, however, impossible. My own court's
ADR program has settled some big money, civil rights, class ac-
tion-type disputes.' Just to be on the safe side, then, it is impor-
tant to discuss the manner in which courts have been treating big-
case consent order settlement reviews. My court's 1995 decision in
United States v. Microsoft Corp.,'5 which overturned the district
court's refusal to approve a settlement between the Department of
Justice and Microsoft under the Tunney Act,66 is perhaps the flag-
ship decision in this area.67 It lays down standards that have since
been applied widely, both in Tunney Act and in non-Tunney Act
settlements:
When the government and a putative defendant present a pro-
posed consent decree to a district court for review under the
Tunney Act, the court can and should inquire ... into the pur-
pose, meaning, and efficacy of the decree. If the decree is ambig-
uous, or the district judge can foresee difficulties in implementa-
tion, we would expect the court to insist that these matters be
attended to. And, certainly, if third parties contend that they
would be positively injured by the decree, a district judge might
well hesitate before assuming that the decree is appropriate. But,
when the government is challenged for not bringing as extensive
an action as it might, a district judge must be careful not to ex-
ceed his or her constitutional role. A decree, even entered as a
pretrial settlement, is a judicial act, and therefore the district
judge is not obliged to accept one that, on its face and even
after government explanation, appears to make a mockery of
judicial power. Short of that eventuality, the Tunney Act cannot
time extensions for determining a new rule relating to hazardous waste, thereby leaving
the "public interest . . . unprotected").
64. Examples of successfully mediated cases include class actions alleging racial dis-
crimination against a federal law enforcement agency; fair housing claims against private
developers for using "white-only" models in advertising, suits against federal agencies for
locating major facilities in residential neighborhoods; wrongful death actions resulting from
helicopter crashes; and a trademark infringement case by one fitness company against
another. Interview with Nancy Stanley, Director, Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs
for the District of Columbia Circuit, September 19, 1997 (on file with author).
65. 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
66. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1994).
67. See id. at 1459.
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be interpreted as an authorization for a district judge to assume
the role of Attorney General.6
In the past, my own Court of Appeals and district courts have
refused to affirm or enforce, or have temporarily restrained, settle-
ments where the interests of third parties were implicated,69 where
none of the remaining plaintiffs had standing,7 ° and where, despite
the parties' voluntary acceptance of binding arbitration, the agency
thought it necessary to rule on a disputed issue as part of its en-
forcement obligations.7 One important issue that we split on near-
ly fifteen years ago, and that remains controversial, is an agency's
ability to avoid a consent decree on the ground that it
impermissibly restricts the administrator's discretion to make cer-
tain policy decisions entrusted to him by statute.72
To summarize, agreements reached through agency ADR,
especially under the existing guidelines, will not normally be ap-
pealed. When these agreements are appealed, however, we can
expect that even under the narrow standard of review applicable
to settlements, courts will take a more careful look at the sur-
rounding circumstances.73 Judicial review of settlements is a safety
valve, and is thus meant to be used only rarely, but agency-an-
nexed ADR settlements should expect to run the same gauntlet as
the rest of their settlement peers, and sometimes to be subjected
to an even closer scrutiny.
68. Id. at 1462.
69. See, e.g., Native Village of Chenega Bay v. Lujan, Civ. A. Nos. 91-483, 91-484,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2986, at *12 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1991) (discussing Alaskan citizens'
successful request for a temporary order restraining settlement between United States
government, State of Alaska and members of the oil industry).
70. See, e.g., Women's Equity Action League v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42, 44 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (remanding to district court for a ruling on whether standing was satisfied).
71. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 864 F.2d 823,
829-31 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that Federal Energy Regulation Commission has continu-
ing regulatory jurisdiction over rates and thus has an independent duty to remedy a
utility's violation of its filed rate schedule).
72. Compare Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1130 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (holding that consent decree did not "impermissibly infringe on the EPA
Administrator's discretion under the Clean Water Act") with Gorsuch, 718 F.2d at 1134
(Wilkey, J., dissenting) ("[A] decree of this type binds not only those present Admin-
istrators who may welcome it, but also their successors who may vehemently oppose it").
73. For example, we can expect courts to inquire into the circumstances of the pri-
vate parties included or any third parties affected by the settlement. Courts will also
examine what has been given up and what received (especially when the quid pro quo
implicates statutory or constitutional rights), and what statutory norms have been depart-
ed from or dispensed with.
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IM. NEGOTIATED REGULATIONS
Finally, I turn to negotiated regulations or "reg neg" (all ado-
lescents have nicknames that they hate). In my view, reg neg is by
far the most innovative and revolutionary aspect of ADR. Court-
annexed and agency-annexed ADR are basically facilitated settle-
ments; thus far, they have made few dramatic inroads into public
law disputes, which have always been amenable to ordinary settle-
ment procedures and consent decrees. On the other hand, reg neg,
in my opinion, is meant to be a partial substitute for formal APA
procedures governing the issuance of agency regulations pursuant
to statutory authority. Under the formal procedures, the APA re-
quires agencies to publish notice of a proposed rule, give interest-
ed persons an opportunity to make comments on the proposed
rule, and to accompany the final published rule with a statement
of the rule's basis and purpose.74 As construed by the courts, the
agency statement must contain a sufficiently detailed rationale,
answers to all significant comments made during the rulemaking
process, and, where appropriate, citation of underlying data.75
Under the negotiated rulemaking process set out in the re-
cently amended 1990 Negotiated Rulemaking Act (NRA),76 the
rulemaking process undergoes an extra "first step." An agency
publishes notice that it will conduct negotiations regarding a possi-
ble rule, names representatives of the "interests" implicated by the
rule, and appoints a facilitator to run the negotiations. 77 If "con-
sensus" is reached through the negotiation, the parties send the
signed agreement, accompanied by a report and any pertinent
documents, to the agency.78 The agency then considers proposing
the rule and opening it up for notice-and-comment under regular
APA procedures.79 While reg neg does not replace notice-and-
74. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
75. See, eg., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (requiring that agency respond to all significant comments and criticizing the pro-
mulgation of rules based on data known only to the agency); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
EPA, 462 F.2d. 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (remanding for Administrator to supply an im-
plementing statement to "enlighten" the court as to how he reached air quality standards
from criteria in the Clean Air Act).
76. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994).
77. See iL at 88 564(a), 566(c)-(d).
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 566 (1994).
79. See ADMwnSTRATVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
SOURCEBOOK 230 (David M. Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 1995).
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comment rulemaking entirely, it precedes it and, if successful,
seems destined to convert the formal proceedings, totally or at
least partially, into a mere formality. Reg neg rules should not, in
theory, require as much record justification as other proposed rules
do, and there should be fewer hostile commenters; therefore chal-
lenges in the courts should-theoretically-be rare.
In reality, however, there is many a gap betwixt the two parts
of the process. Unhappy participants in the negotiation process
may refuse to sign the agreement, and non-participants may feel
that they are not bound by it in any way. Additionally, the agency
may change its mind either before or after the formal notice-and-
comment period, and may propose or issue a rule that is different
from the rule agreed upon in the negotiations. As I understand it,
different agencies play by different rules, and sometimes the
agency's representative will not have the authority to commit the
agency to proposing a rule, or even to state the agency's inclina-
tions or negotiating limits.
Despite all these snags, the process has been used for some
time now, and it works in many cases.80 And although its propo-
nents may sometimes, as Professor Coglianese suggests, overstate
its successes,8' the Clinton Administration continues to push for
its increased use.' Reg neg has been invoked by 17 agencies in
the formulation of 35 rules in 13 years, with the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) taking the lead. The National Perfor-
mance Review claims that negotiated rulemaking has reduced
EPA's rate of rule litigation from 80% to 20%.' Professor
Coglianese disputes those figures. He posits that even those reg
negs that result in the issuance of rules do not save much time
over regular rulemaking procedures, and that the percentage of
judicial appeals following those few success stories is about the
same as the percentage of appeals of regular rules (from 1987-
1991, 6 of the 12 EPA reg neg rules have been appealed).!4 He
concludes that "[i]n the aggregate, negotiated rulemaking has not
generated any substantial difference in the way that legal challeng-
es get resolved.""5
80. See Philip . Harter, The Adolescence of Administrative ADR, ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS, Spring 1996, at 2.
81. See Coglianese, supra note 3, at 1257-59.
82. See Steenland & Appel, supra note 47, at 817.
83. See Coglianese, supra note 3, at 1287.
84. See id. at 1301.
85. Id. at 1308. Coglianese also states that nearly half of all the appeals of EPA
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I, however, reject the premise that the game is not worth
playing if it doesn't produce dramatic improvements fast. As any
parent knows, we must not be too impatient with the rate of an
adolescent's progress, so long as he is progressing. If reg neg can,
without adding substantial time or cost, contribute to a better
rulemaking process by increasing satisfaction among the partici-
pants and bringing about a fuller exchange of information at the
negotiation stage, why should we care if it doesn't rise above the
rulemaking norm in terms of time required and number of judicial
challenges brought? In any case, our experience with reg neg, as
with other kinds of ADR, is still too incomplete to support any
broad conclusions regarding its long-term promise.
A. Scope of Review
Many questions about how a court reviews a reg neg rule
remain unanswered. 6 Unlike the majority of court-annexed or
agency-annexed ADR settlements, reg neg rules usually involve
some aspect of public policy. Given this, I would not have expect-
ed courts to give them any less searching a review than they
would apply to rules consummated entirely through regular proce-
dures. Interestingly enough, however, there was a lively debate
about the appropriate standard of review for reg neg rules in the
1980s, before section 570 of the NRA settled it:
Any agency action relating to establishing, assisting, or terminat-
ing a negotiated rulemaking committee under this subchapter
shall not be subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section
rules challenged in the D.C. Circuit between 1979 and 1990 were voluntarily dismissed
before argument. See Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Dis-
turbance in the Regulatory Process, 30 L. & Soc'Y REv. 735, 756 (1996). Once a chal-
lenge is lodged, he points out, the parties can return to settlement talks, with fewer
participants than in reg neg and usually with an "added degree of secrecy." See id. at
757. Moreover, he argues that formal challenges of EPA rules do not disturb ongoing
relationships between EPA and nongovernmental or industry groups that are in continual
contact with EPA. Typically such challenges are considered "business as usual." See id. at
736-37.
86. For further discussion of these issues, see Philip . Harter, The Role of Courts in
Regulatory Negotiation-A Response to Judge Wald, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 51, 60-69
(1986) (suggesting that courts give agencies greater leeway in determining whether a
result falls within the zone of reasonableness where a broad enough range of interests
are represented during the rulemaking process); Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environ-
mental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?, 10 COLuM. J. ENvL. L. 1, 17-25 (1985)
(analyzing and criticizing a proposal for limiting judicial review of negotiated regulations).
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shall bar judicial review of a rule if such judicial review is other-
wise provided by law. A rule which is the product of negotiated
rulemaking and is subject to judicial review shall not be accorded
any greater deference by a court than a rule which is the product
of other rulemaking procedures.7
Section 570 seems to indicate that a negotiated rule cannot be
challenged on the ground that the negotiated rulemaking process
itself was deficient, at least until the final rule is promulgated. It
does not, however, answer the question whether the preliminary
negotiating process can be attacked when the final rule is
appealed-and if so, on what grounds. Chief Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit, the first appellate judge to discuss reg neg in an
opinion, raises this question in USA Group Loan Services, Inc. v.
Riley,88 but basically leaves it unanswered. The rule under attack
in USA Group Loan Services involved the regulation of private
intermediary guarantors of government-backed student loans.89
The industry argued that the 1990 "negotiated rulemaking" direc-
tives had been violated, and that the Department of Education
had carried on negotiations in "bad faith." This bad faith was evi-
denced by the fact that after the negotiation was completed the
Department issued a proposed rule markedly different from the
one that had been agreed to in the negotiations-the one which
the Department agent had assured the negotiating parties would
be formally proposed barring "compelling reasons to depart."'
Among other things, the challengers complained that the Secretary
had initially offered to put a cap on the industry's liability; when
the industry balked at subjecting themselves to any liability, the
87. 5 U.S.C. § 570 (1994). During the NRA floor debate, Senator Sander Levin, the
bill's sponsor, stated that:
The purpose of this provision is to allow agencies to use negotiated rulemaking
without the delays and procedural problems that might arise if judicial review
of intermediate agency actions were available, while also continuing the tradition
in Federal administrative law of permitting judicial review of agency rules at the
time those rules are promulgated.
135 CONG. R c S10,064 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989). Congressman Barney Frank, who
chaired the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the
House Judiciary Committee, which processed the bill, agreed: "[t]he intention here was
not to confer any rights or additional rights; it was to codify a process ... nor do I
think there is any language which confers new rights of judicial review which did not
previously exist." 136 CONG. REC. H1855 (daily ed. May 1, 1990).
88. 82 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1996).
89. Id. at 711.
90. Id. at 714.
1460 [V/ol. 46:1445
ADR AND THE COURTS
Secretary withdrew his proposal and ultimately issued a rule with
no liability cap.9'
Judge Posner's opinion displays a fair amount of skepticism
about the whole negotiated rulemaking procedure, which he de-
scribes as "a novelty in the administrative process."92 He com-
ments that the NRA strongly implied that there could be no "bad
faith" challenges in court to such negotiations. Further, even if
such challenges were available, the USA Group Loan Services
petitioners could not carry the day:
The propriety of such a promise [by the agency representative
that the agency would go forward with the agreement barring
compelling reasons] may be questioned. It sounds like an abdica-
tion of regulatory authority to the regulated, the full burgeoning
of the interest-group state, and the final confirmation of the
"capture" theory of administrative regulation. 3
In any case, he asserts, no such promise would be enforceable:
The practical effect of enforcing it would be to make the Act
extinguish notice and comment rulemaking in all cases in which it
was preceded by negotiated rulemaking; the comments would be
irrelevant if the agency were already bound by promises that it
had made to the industry. There is no textual or other clue that
the Act meant to do this. Unlike collective bargaining negotia-
tions, to which the servicers compare negotiated rulemaking, the
Act does not envisage that the negotiations will end in a binding
contract. The Act simply creates a consultative process in ad-
vance of the more formal arms' length procedure of notice and
comment rulemaking.9
Furthermore, Judge Posner firmly denies the industry's pleas
for more discovery into circumstances surrounding the negotiations
(apparently the district court had allowed some), but adds provoc-
atively that "[i]f as we doubt the Negotiated Rulemaking Act
creates a remedy [for deficient negotiation] as well as a right, we
suppose that a refusal to negotiate that really was in bad faith,
because the agency was determined to stonewall, might invalidate
91. See icL
92. 1&
93. Id.
94. Id. at 714-15 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 566(t) (1994)).
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the rule."95 No prima facie evidence of bad faith appeared here,
however, and "[t]he Act's purpose-to reduce judicial challenges
to regulations by encouraging the parties to narrow their differenc-
es in advance of the formal rulemaking proceeding-would be
poorly served if the negotiations became a source and focus of
litigation."96
What should we deduce from USA Group Loan Services re-
garding the possibility of challenging a reg neg rule on the ground
that the negotiations were a sham? Judge Posner thinks it unlikely
that the NRA was intended to permit such challenges, but he does
not shut the door altogether on genuine "bad faith" claims. Why
not? It could certainly be argued that if a negotiated rule subse-
quently went through the APA notice-and-comment process, and is
not vulnerable to judicial challenge on any APA ground, any de-
fects in the parties' preliminary promenade should be irrelevant.
Obviously the APA itself provides no basis for invalidating such a
rule, and the plain language of section 570 of the NRA can hardly
be read to do so either. Participants in a "bad faith" negotiation
who find that they have been seduced and abandoned might be
sadder and wiser, but why should the ultimate rule be invalidated
unless the agency has somehow tricked or misled interested per-
sons into not commenting on or participating in the formal
rulemaking process? A party might allege, for example, that the
agency stated in the public notice that the proposed rule incorpo-
rated the consensus of a genuine negotiated process when it had
not. In such cases, though, the agency misconduct would consist of
the issuance of the misleading APA notice itself, although demon-
strating its falsity might lead to an examination of the underlying
negotiation process. Short of that situation, however, it is still not
clear why even Judge Posner's hypothetical sham negotiation
would invalidate a final rule that passed APA muster.
On the other hand, it could be argued that when Congress
mandates a negotiation, the agency is not free to waste everyone's
time by flouting its instructions. In the extreme, could the agency
ignore the mandate altogether and go straight to formal
rulemaking? Probably not, or at least a good case could be made
out to require the agency to perform the nondiscretionary duty of
conducting the negotiation. The likelihood, however, that courts
95. Id. at 715.
96. Id.
1462 [Vol. 46:1445
ADR AND THE COURTS
will go much beyond assuring that a required negotiation takes
place and decide whether the agency was playing a bona fide role
throughout, seems to me slim. Short of smoking gun evidence that
the agency never had any intention of engaging in real negotia-
tions, we can expect courts to shy away from examining the dy-
namics of the negotiations-even after the rulemaking is over. But,
again I must caution, the circumstances under, and the degree to
which courts will enter that arena remain unchartered territory.
B. Who Can Challenge a Reg Neg Rule?
Another interesting and unanswered question is whether a
disgruntled party to the negotiation can submit, in the formal com-
ment period and as part of the administrative record of the finally
issued rule, a description of allegedly unfair aspects of the preced-
ing negotiations, where the proposed rule purports to be and is in
fact based on a "consensus" of other parties to the negotiations.
By such a submission, a nonconsenting party could seek to discred-
it the other parties' claim of consensus and perhaps even justify
the commenter's own repudiation of any earlier agreement not to
challenge the rule. I see no grounds under the APA on which the
malcontent could be barred from submitting such a comment. The
weight a reviewing court would accord to it is a different matter.
An equally nettlesome question is whether a rule that was based
on an agreement reached by a reg neg process could be chal-
lenged by a nonparticipant in the negotiation who claimed that not
all of the necessary "interests" were at the bargaining table,97 or
that the representatives present were "bought off" or for other
reasons failed to represent their constituencies adequately.
These hypotheticals illustrate the broader question of who
should be able to challenge a final rule based on a consensus ar-
rived at through negotiation. Obviously, the normal rules of stand-
ing permit only those who participated in the formal agency
notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding, and who can satisfy
the Article IlI justiciability requirements of injury, causation, and
redressability, to challenge a final rule. 8 A nonparticipant in the
97. See iL at 715; see also, e.g., National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Comm.,
711 F.2d 1071, 1073 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that an advisory committee convened
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act may be challenged if it is not "fairly bal-
anced").
98. See Water Transp. Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 819 F.2d 1189, 1194
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reg neg who meets normal standing requirements certainly seems
eligible to do so;99 seemingly a disgruntled reg neg participant
who satisfies normal standing requirements and did not sign the
consensus statement would also be eligible to challenge the rule.
But would the courts reject a consensus-signer who simply changed
her mind later? What if a consensus signer were persuaded in a
different direction by comments made during the formal
rulemaking, as agencies themselves sometimes are, and decided to
challenge the rule on appeal? What about an organization that
originally signed the consensus but has undergone a change in
leadership in the interim, and now opposes the consensus agree-
ment? Are all members of a trade association which signed the
agreement bound as individual entities, even when their individual
interests differ from the organization's?
The answers to these questions have important implications
for the attractiveness of the reg neg process to agencies and po-
tential challengers of a rule. If courts take a restrictive attitude to-
ward challenges to final rules which incorporate previously negoti-
ated consensus principles, the agency may feel comfortable in
foregoing the kind or at least the amount of independent research
and verification it would otherwise feel compelled to undertake in
order to support the rule. If, on the other hand, seemingly satis-
fied participants in the negotiation can too easily challenge the
underlying process on appeal later on, the agency may feel com-
pelled to keep its guard up, and to produce the usual ponderous
record for the formal rulemaking, rendering the entire negotiation
process decidedly less attractive. Indeed, in USA Group Loan Ser-
vices, the industry complained that there was "scanty articulation
by the Secretary of the grounds for the challenged parts of the
regulation." 1" Judge Posner quickly diverted that attack by
pointing out that under Seventh Circuit precedent, the complain-
ants were obliged to conduct their own studies, and to put their
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
99. This tentative 'conclusion, however, is subject to a further caveat: could someone
with notice of an agency's intention to conduct a reg neg and of the list of the represen-
tatives who wpuld participate, who did not herself apply to participate as a representative
in the negotiations, later be held not to have exhausted her administrative remedies inso-
far as her ability to challenge the conduct of the negotiation was concerned? See 5
U.S.C. § 564(b) (1994) (allowing persons who believe their interests will not be adequate-
ly represented to apply for membership on negotiating committee).
100. USA Group Loan Se'vs., 82 F.3d at 713.
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data before the Secretary if they thought his studies and data were
inadequate.10' The next time around, however, a truncated adminis-
trative record induced by the reg neg consensus might not so
easily pass APA muster because it does not contain the "substan-
tial evidence"'" necessary to justify the rule. The greater the risk
of a future challenge, the greater the burden on the agency to
compile a record sufficient to meet ordinary APA review stan-
dards, at the expense of forfeiting any cost and resource gains that
are supposed to come from hammering out a consensus regulation.
If an agency sticks to its side of the bargain and submits a
proposed rule embodying the reg neg consensus, it does not seem
altogether implausible for a court to enforce the other signers'
agreement not to challenge the rule, just as courts will enforce
parties' agreements to waive their rights to go to court. But, on
the other hand, what is sauce for the goose ought to be sauce for
the gander, and if a consensus signer finds herself persuaded oth-
erwise by comments made during the formal rulemaking, why
should a court refuse to entertain her challenges on appeal so long
as she meets the other Article III standing requirements? After
all, under the prevailing rules of the reg neg process, the agency
always retains the ultimate option of changing its mind about
proposing the consensus both before and after the formal
rulemaking process." Since any private party will have to submit
comments in the formal agency rulemaking in order to bring a
later appeal, the agency will receive notice of her change of heart
in time to bolster its record response before the final rule is is-
sued. And because the "consensus" will often be comprised of
only agreement on "broad principles," with the agency left to draft
the details, we can expect some participants to claim that the
proposed rule is not in accord with the "principles" to which they
agreed. I would expect that courts will be most reluctant to wade
into the thistle-strewn thicket of enforcing consensus agreements
on either side.
Finally, there will be cases where the agency ultimately pro-
poses a rule containing some, but not all, parts of the consensus,
and a party to the original negotiation claims that her agreement
to the package deal does not oblige her to support any and all
101. See id. at 713-14.
102. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)(4) (1994).
103. See USA Group Loan Servs., 82 F.3d at 714-15.
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concatenations of its elements. Can that party now challenge all
the parts of the rule, including those to which she had previously
agreed? Does the fact that a negotiation implies a holistic set of
exchanges by all the parties mean that any deviation from the
original agreement releases the parties from their promises regard-
ing each component of the agreement?"1' None of these questions
have yet been answered.
C. The Standard of Review
A court could, of course, simply ignore everything that pre-
ceded the formal notice of rulemaking, assuming, like Judge
Posner, that any preliminary negotiations were basically irrelevant
to the court's appraisal of the final rule." In at least two prior ap-
peals of reg neg rules, the D.C. Circuit has affirmed the rules
without any discussion or even reference to the underlying negoti-
ations.1°6 For some aspects of judicial review, that is clearly the
right stance. It seems pretty clear, for instance, that a court would
apply the test set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Re-
source Defense Council, Inc. °7 Under the Chevron "Step I1108
the court would analyze the reg neg rule's conformity with con-
gressional intent in the same way it always does, since no negotia-
tion consensus could affect the courts' obligation to enforce unam-
biguous congressional intent. In fact, one negotiated rule failed on
104. See, ag., OXY USA, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 64 F.3d 679,
701 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that petitioners who supported a change in methodology
that was embodied in a proposed settlement could challenge the final settlement on ap-
peal because other parts of the proposed settlement had been changed). The OXY USA
court reasoned that:
By advocating a specific settlement, petitioners did not forfeit their standing to
object to elements of the settlement to which they had agreed if changes made
in others by the Commission work to their overall disadvantage. This recognizes
the reality that businessmen will yield on particular points if they are satisfied
that the net results of an agreement will accrue to their benefit.
lId at 689.
105. See USA Group Loan Servs., 82 F.3d at 714.
106. In prior cases dealing with reg neg, our court has usually ignored the reg neg
origin of the rules. See, e.g., National Resource Defense Council v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that EPA regulations are a reasonable exercise of authority and
discretion without mentioning the origin of the regulation); Safe Bldgs. Alliance v. EPA,
846 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that EPA regulations covering asbestos hazards
were within the mandate of the Asbestos Emergency Response Act without discussing
the reg neg origins).
107. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
108. See id.
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appeal because the court found that the agency had not accurately
considered the legislative intent.'09 It is when the court moves on,
and assesses a rule under the Chevron "Step I" reasonableness
test,"0 or under the APA's arbitrary and capricious test,"' that
the question of whether the court is entitled to take the negotiated
origin of the rule into account arises. If the court can consider the
consensus as a factor in support of the rule's reasonableness, the
issue of a challenger's eligibility to impugn the integrity of the
negotiation that produced the consensus moves to center stage.
The NRA permits a rulemaking committee to include in its
agency report any information that it deems appropriate;" the
NRA also allows any committee member to include any informa-
tion it wishes as an addendum to the report.' Why then is it not
entirely reasonable for a court to consider, as persuasive evidence
of the reasonableness of the rule, the fact that all or even most of
the major interested parties in the negotiation have acceded to it?
Indeed, in non-reg neg situations courts often do acknowledge the
unanimous or majority endorsement of a rule by affected groups.
Of course, consensus alone would not insulate a rule that was
facially unreasonable, or that lacked substantial evidence to sup-
port a key factual predicate, but it might weigh in to counter an
allegation of arbitrariness in a close case. Put another way, a court
might tolerate something less than the "hard look" rationale it
generally requires from an agency, on the ground that there must
have been significant give and take in the negotiations, and that if
the end product makes overall sense, the details of the "deal"
need not resemble the brainchild of a committee of agency ex-
perts. Cannot the negotiation process itself attest to a court that
reasonable alternatives have been seriously considered? After all,
in authorizing the reg neg process, Congress must have realized
that the pragmatism of negotiation would sometimes supplant the
logic of pure intellect. But again, even if that posture prevails, the
agency must take the bitter with the sweet. If a court is allowed to
give credence to the preliminary process to support an agency's
decision, it follows that interested parties must be able to chal-
109. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
110. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
111. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
112. See 5 U.S.C. § 566(f) (1994).
113. See id.
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lenge the validity of the process with information regarding its
deficiencies. That may well be a reason why courts so far have
downplayed the reg neg process in their opinions until it was di-
rectly challenged in the USA Group Loan Services case.
My own feeling is that the court should be able to take ac-
count of consensus as a factor suggesting the reasonableness of the
rule. That in turn may justify a more modest amount of factual
justification and explanation of rationale than is required in the
usual statement of basis and purpose for a rule. When the agency
follows that course, however, it always runs some risk that an
outlier, or even one who has previously signed on, will later bring
a challenge on the merits or even challenge the negotiation pro-
cess during the comment period. And the reviewing court must
still have an irreducible minimum of backup evidence; one can't
expect courts to abdicate their responsibility of ensuring that the
agency has given some plausible reasons for all aspects of the rule
that affect the public interest. A reviewing court must be ever
mindful of the bare possibility that the parties have conducted
their horse-trading without regard for some public interest meant
to be protected by the statute. Indeed, the best insurance against
reg neg deteriorating into the interest-bargaining paradigm that
Judge Posner feared lies in the requirement that judicial review
accord with the APA's baseline standards of rationality." 4
D. The Agency's Obligation in a Reg Neg
Although reg neg supporters would normally welcome the
opportunity for as eminent a jurist as Judge Posner to formally
integrate reg neg into administrative review, the father of reg neg
has labeled the USA Group Loan Services case a "disappoint-
ment.""' 5 Philip Harter asserts that Judge Posner's dismissal of
reg neg as a "novelty" and comparison of it to the "capture" of a
regulatory agency by the industry illustrate a failure to understand
the goals or dynamics of the reg neg process." 6 Harter claims,
114. One could even argue that although section 570 of the APA says that no "great-
er deference" should be given to negotiated rules, lesser deference is in fact appropriate
because the agency is not using its expertise, but rather is delegating it to private parties.
See 5 U.S.C. § 570 (1994).
115. Letter from Clay Wheeler, Editor-in-Chief, Duke Law Journal, to author (Feb. 3,
1997) (on file with author).
116. See id. In fact, the 1992 Higher Education Act Amendments involved in Group
Loan Services required discussions and negotiations not only with the regulated guaran-
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"[t]he court's narrow, erroneous perspective... colored the rest
of the analysis."" 7
Whether such a blanket put-down is merited, Judge Posner
did highlight one still-sticky facet of reg neg when he criticized the
industry for relying on an agency representative's promise to sub-
mit the agreed-upon draft as its proposed rule "in the absence of
compelling reasons.""8 Judge Posner doubted that an agency
representative should have any such authority to commit the agen-
cy." 9 Yet, the 1990 Act does instruct an agency head who is decid-
ing whether to undertake a reg neg to consider whether the agen-
cy "to the maximum extent possible consistent with the legal obli-
gations of the agency, will use the consensus ... with respect to
the proposed rule as the basis for the rule proposed by the agency
for notice and comment."' 2
While no one disputes the agency's right to change its mind
about any part of the proposed rule as a result of the formal com-
ment process, if the agency too cursorily declines to even propose
the consensus rule, the viability of the whole negotiating process is
seriously impugned, and participants will be chary of expending
much effort on it. Thus, the critical question of whether an agency
representative can properly bind the agency to do anything as a
result of the negotiating process remains unanswered, and it is a
fair criticism that Judge Posner passed it over too lightly. Experi-
enced reg neg participants point out that the process is least pro-
tors themselves, but also with other interested parties. See USA Group Loan Servs., Inc.
v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 1996).
117. Letter from Clay Wheeler to author, supra note 115.
118. USA Group Loan Servs., 82 F.3d at 714.
119. See id. (citing Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156,
194 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding the agency's unlimited right to renege on its promise to
go forward with a negotiated solution)). In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., de-
cided before the Negotiated Rulemaking Act came into effect and dealing with EPA pol-
lutant discharge permits, the D.C. Circuit noted that agency negotiations with interested
parties had played a significant role in shaping the challenged rule, but nevertheless re-
viewed the rule under the same standards applicable to other rules. See 859 F.2d at
192-95. Referring to Mr. Harter's earlier writings, the court said:
A commentator on negotiated rulemaking urges agencies engaged in such a pro-
cess not to make changes in the proposed rules except in response to a merito-
rious comment, arguing that a practice of making sua sponte changes may lead
the negotiation process to unravel . . . .But the soundness of that advice to
the agency, however great, cannot impair its legal right to make such changes.
Id. at 194-95 (citing Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71
GEO. L.J. 1, 102 (1982)).
120. 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(7) (1994).
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ductive when the key agency representative either refuses to reveal
the agency's positions or bottom lines during the negotiation pro-
cess, or refuses to commit to advancing a consensus reached as the
presumptive basis for a proposed rule."' If the agency, barring
significant new developments, feels no commitment to go forward
with a consensus in which its own representative participated, the
negotiation becomes just another public hearing or discovery
mechanism, and nonagency parties will have little incentive to sign
away their rights to challenge a consensus rule in court when the
agency refuses to make a parallel commitment to go forward with
it, even to the formal proposal stage.
On the ultimate question of an agency's ability to legally bind
itself in advance to proposing a consensus rule, Judge Posner may
have exaggerated when he suggested that an agency representative
might not be authorized to make even the equivocal commitment
to propose the rule "in the absence of compelling reasons."''
My take on the issue is that if the agency is willing, after consulta-
tion at its highest levels, to authorize its representative to make
such a commitment at the end of negotiation, no law has been
violated and indeed the thrust of the NRA has been furthered.
Obviously the agency will usually give itself an emergency exit
route, as it apparently did in USA Group Loan Services,"z in case
some unexpected factor surfaces after the negotiation. But even
with such a hedge, the agency's commitment will demonstrate a
seriousness, otherwise lacking, to the other participants; this maxi-
mizes the potential for honest bargaining toward a true consensus.
There may be no way to compel an agency to make such a com-
mitment, but it would be strange for a court to tell an agency that
it can't delegate such authority to its negotiating representative.
Still, the sixty-four thousand dollar question remains: if the
agency can and does make a commitment to propose a consensus
rule, will the agency's promise be enforced by a court? Here, I
would guess ultimately not."u I think there is still strong senti-
121. See Stephen B. Goldberg, Reflections on Negotiated Rulemaking: From Conflict to
Consensus, WASH. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 42.
122. USA Group Loan Servs., 82 F.3d at 714.
123. See id. at 713-15.
124. Cf Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Servs. v. Feinstein, 103 F.3d 151, 152 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (holding that a district court has no jurisdiction to enjoin NLRB proceedings
pursuant to an unfair labor practice charge initiated according to statutorily mandated
procedures because of prior agreement between General Counsel and respondent as to
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ment in the judiciary, for reasons akin to those spelled out in Pro-
fessor Funk's essay in this symposium,'25 that at every step in the
process, agency officials must and do act in the public interest and
that they should not be weighted down by prior commitments to
interested parties. Time and space do not permit any detailed dis-
cussion of my belief that this is not essentially how government
policymaking works: in my experience, formal rulemaking as well
as reg neg procedure involve a continuous round of balancing op-
posing interests all the way through the agency hierarchy, and
from there to the White House. The reg neg process actually re-
stricts in some measure, through its insistence on face-to-face ne-
gotiations, the intrusion of political and extrasubstantive consider-
ations at all levels of rulemaking, agency and White House, and
from all sources, identified and unidentified.
Yet the notion that an agency should bind itself to introduce
a particular proposed rule through an agreement with other par-
ties, thereby signing away its discretion to pursue what it may later
for whatever reason come to believe is in the best interest of the
general public, sounds anomalous and even sinister to most peo-
ple-certainly it did to Judge Posner.'26 However, agencies do
enter enforceable agreements with parties before them every day
in the adjudicatory-enforcement sphere, including agreements not
to prosecute or penalize a person or organization who behaves in
a certain way; these agreements too may have wide-ranging effects
on, and implications for, the public interest. Why should
rulemaking be so different-especially when all interested parties
get a crack at the proposed rule during the comment period, and
no one challenges the right of the agency to change its mind at
that stage if it is persuaded by any of those commenters? The
difference, I think, lies in the peculiar role of reg neg as a prelude
to, rather than a substitute for, the regular statutorily mandated
APA rulemaking process whose independence, integrity and trans-
parency judges feel they must keep intact.
special procedures for handling multiple charges against health care chain).
125. See generally William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DuKE L.J. 1351 (1997) (arguing
that the theory and practice of negotiated rulemaking subtly subvert the basic concept of
administrative law, which should be "agenc[y] pursuit of the public interest through law
and reasoned decisionmaking").
126. See USA Group Loan Servs., 82 F.3d at 714.
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The fit of reg neg into the formal rulemaking processes is an
uneasy one. Although it precedes and does not replace the pro-
cesses in form, it tries to do just that in reality. Over the decades
the neat paradigm of formal rulemaking, notice of proposed rules,
comment, and issuance of final rule has been overlaid by heavy
lobbying on and off the record, midstream changes in rule propos-
als, revisions at the White House, Office of Management and Bud-
get review, and even occasional congressional directives, so that
the final process more nearly resembles a mini-legislative engage-
ment than a model of executive decisionmaking in the public inter-
est. Reg neg acts as a device to cabin in some of that interchange
and at least informally commit the participants to a consensus
decision reached in open negotiations. Nonetheless the introduction
of this extra process into an unaltered APA rulemaking procedure,
which seems to assume isolated, nonpolitical expert agency
decisionmakers assiduously reviewing data and making judgments
based on subject matter expertise only, d6es produce tension, and
leaves judges disconcerted as to whether they should realistically
recognize what has gone on before the final rulemaking, or push
forward with the myth that the formal process is really the only
part of the process that can be acknowledged. Judge Posner's
foray into this unchartered territory in USA Group Loan Services
seems to prefer the latter approach,127 but if reg neg is to go
much farther, its legitimacy as an intrinsic and congressionally
mandated or authorized part of the rulemaking process must be
formally recognized and dealt with by courts, even belatedly in its
adolescence.
CONCLUSION
Court-annexed ADR is neither a panacea nor a failure. It has
enjoyed some modest successes, participants seem to like it, and
courts are increasingly focusing on settlements, even without assis-
tance from formalized ADR programs. Agency-annexed ADR is
also gaining some momentum, but courts are likely to see only a
few cases resolved under this procedure, at least so long as the
procedure is reserved for the one-on-one negotiations that do not
generally implicate public policies. I think, however, that courts
will review agency ADR cases with great care, to ensure that
127. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
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disadvantaged parties are not hoodwinked or intimidated by the
agency into surrendering valuable statutory protections.
As for reg neg, its relatively low profile could change, and
many intriguing questions about the scope of review that courts
will apply to its product still remain. The variations I have dealt
with in this piece are still mostly theoretical," but even as
hypotheticals they help us to see the need for parties involved
with reg neg to insist that the agency spell out ahead of time what
its stance will be with regard to implementing any consensus. The
first case in which reg neg received any judicial attention may
have too casually dismissed it as a novelty, or as something akin
to a voluntary industry standard. But there will be opportunities
for other courts to pick up the slack, and integrate reg neg into
our administrative law. Although its use has been limited to date,
this promising adolescent deserves a niche in administrative law
that justifies further clarification of its relationship to formal
rulemaking and judicial review.
128. Many of these theoretical variations were also made by Professor Ronald Levin
in 1991. See Ronald M. Levin, Judicial Review of Negotiated Rules: The "Reg-Neg Re-
nege" and Other Problems, Address Before the American Bar Association Conference on
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Energy and Environmental Regulatory Proceedings
(Nov. 15, 1991) (on file with author).
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